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Smith: Private Pensions and Federal Securities Regulations: The Decades

PRIVATE PENSIONS AND FEDERAL SECURITIES
REGULATIONS: THE DECADES OF NEGLECT
RALPH
I.

R.

SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

During his testimony before a committee of the House of Representatives
in 1941, a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter
cited as SEC or Commission) contended that although his agency had
jurisdiction over the still fledgling pension fund industry, it had no interest
in regulating it.1 In fact, he expressed the hope that Congress would limit the
SEC's authority in this area by exempting most pension plans from the
Securities Act of 1933.2 Some members of the committee regarded this
position with suspicion. 3 Even in 1941 it was unusual for an administrative
agency to voluntarily seek to limit its own authority. But strange as it may
have seemed at the time, that was the SEC's position. The even more
suprising fact is that that position remains substantially unchanged to this
day. Over three decades later, the SEC continues to contend that in theory,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Steve Migousky, Esq., J.D. 1975, Boston College, and Robert
Hunter, J.D. 1977 University of Pennsylvania.
** This portion of the paper was written prior to the passage of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and therefore does not refer to that important piece of
legislation. Nor does the paper cover those developments in the area which have occured since
1974. It was written, rather, to serve as a framework for an extensive analysis of ERISA, which
will be published as a second installment in this Journal.
1. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 895 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings].
2. Securities Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa, § 77b-h (1970) (original version at ch. 38, § 1 et.
seq., 48 Stat. (1933)) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
3. One particular interchange demonstrates the skepticism:
-- Commissioner Purcell: Well, I must remind you again, Congressman, you must keep this
clear, our suggestion is for exemption and not for inclusion in the Act.
-Mr. Wolverton: I am perfectly aware of the adroitness that can be readily discerned in the
presentation of an exemption which in fact establishes a basis of control as to other cases.
-- Commissioner Purcell: May I say, for the Commission, that that is not our intention in
submitting this proposal, Mr. Congressman.
-Mr. Wolverton: Well, I cannot just agree with the statement that you have made, but for
the moment, I will just pass it with the thought that when any commission comes to Congress
and asks exemptions, and it is presented on the theory that you want to take away some of the
authority that they now have, I am just a little bit suspicious, because in most instances the
commissions come asking additional power. So, you can readily understand why I am inquiring
so carefully into this question of exemptions. It just seems a reversal of the usual procedure.
Most commissions are reaching out for more power rather than less.
-Commissioner Purcell: I hope, sir, that we will represent a notable exception to your views
with respect to commissions.
-Mr. Wolverton: It would be a notable exception if you established it.
1941 Hearings, supra note 1, at 904-05.
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interests in pension plans are within the ambit of federal securities legislation. However, in practice the SEC still refuses to apply the provisions of
this legislation to the plans. And recently, through its own efforts, the
legislative exemption it sought since 1941 was finally granted.4
Like its earlier reticence, the SEC's consistency is not a hallmark of
administrative agencies. It also leads one to suspect that this consistency is
either a case of remarkable farsightedness, a settled area, or a studied
indifference to any changes three decades may have wrought.
Unchanged this area of the law is not. Americans have become increasingly concerned with the necessity of protecting themselves against the
financial hazards of death, serious illness, permanent disability, unemployment, and retirement. This concern has triggered the creation and stimulated
the growth of a number of protective devices, among which are governmentassured unemployment and social security programs, 5 and privately sponsored insurance against death, disease, disability and retirement. 6 Whether
considered individually or collectively, however, none of these devices
sufficiently allay the concern of American workers. Unemployment compensation is essentially a between-job allowance of limited duration and
amount. 7 Social security is a rather rigid system which barely assures
subsistence to the retired or disabled worker and guarantees a significant8
reduction in style of living for all but families of most modest income.
Finally, group insurance is essentially concerned with the welfare needs of
present employees and seldom provides for adequate post-retirement or
death benefits.
Partly in response to the clear need for a more comprehensive and flexible
device for protecting the interest of the American worker, a fourth response
was developed-the private employer-sponsored employee benefit plan. It
can be broadly divided into two categories: one, welfare benefits providing
for sick pay, hospitalization costs; two, retirement or pension benefits
which are activated by satisfaction of a minimum service requirement or
4. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
5. Practically every state in the country statutorily guarantees the temporary continuation
of compensation in cases of forced unemployment. Generally financed by mandatory contributions from employers, the plans annually provide compensation to over one million temporarily
displaced American workers. The Federal government does its share by way of the Social
Security Administration. Created in 1935, this agency presently administers benefits under a
compilation of statutes providing for Old Age Survivors Disability and Hospital Insurance
(OASDHI) benefits.
6. One indication of the growing popularity of private insurance plans is the tremendous
increase in benefit payments for income loss due to short term illness. In 1948, total benefit
payments were 286.8 million. By 1967 this figure increased 500% to 1,377.4 million. Price,
Income-Loss Protection Against Illness, 1947-48, 32 Soc. SEC. BULL. 21, 26 (1969).
7. The average weekly benefit for total unemployment rose from $10.56 in 1940 to $49.11
in 1970. Current OperatingStatistics, 33 Soc. SEC. BULL. 21, 26 (1970).
However, this latter figure can hardly be considered adequate even in the areas of the
country with low cost of living.
8. Average monthly OASDHI cash retirement worker benefits rose form $63.09 in 1956 to
$100.40 by the end of 1969.
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occurrence of a permanent disability. As with group insurance, employee
benefit plans, especially pension plans, have experienced a period of unparalleled growth in recent decades. 9 In 1940 there were some 1,965 private
employee pension plans covering under four million workers.' ° By
1970, there were over one hundred thousand plans covering some thirty
million workers-approximately half of the labor force." During this same
period assets of these plans increased ten thousand percent (from 1. 1 billion
dollars to over 130 Billion) making private pension plans one
of the largest
2
sources of investment capital in the United States today.'
Thus, the intransigence of the SEC must be viewed against a landscape
which has changed remarkably over the past generation. It is against this
background that one must judge whether the policy of benign neglect, if
ever justified, is still warranted-or whether it is of any consequence at all.
Since much of the administrative policy has been sanctioned by statute, the
wisdom, efficacy, and necessity of the legislative action must be considered.
This portion of this paper will attempt to review the various rationalizations which are the underpinnings of both the administrative and legislative
"hands-off" approach, discuss what the impact of such a posture has been,
and ascertain whether the present treatment is necessitated by or consistent
with the purpose and scheme of federal securities legislation. The second
installment will discuss SEC policy in 1972; the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 and recent development in this area.

II.

PRIVATE EMPLOYEE PENSION PLANS

A.

PotentialMeans of Regulation
The "issuer" 1 3 of a private employee pension plan that was not exempted
in the Securities Act of 1933 would be prohibited from offering employees
9. To some extent, this growth seems to have resulted from a general belief that the
benefits would boost employee morale and productivity and possibly form a mild increase in
social responsibility on the part of employers. For the most part, however, the dramatic growth
since 1940 must be attributed to three significant factors. First, employee benefit plans became
more attractive with the sharp rise in corporate income taxes after 1940 and the favorable
treatment afforded to qualified plans under § 165 (now § 401) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Briefly, that section provides that contributions to the trust through which the plan is funded
are deductible when made; payments are not taxable to employees until actually received; and
the trust itself is exempt from taxation. Second, the wage ceiling imposed during World War II
stimulated the granting of pension and other benefits as additional compensation. See generally
Note, The National War Labor Board: The Evolution of a National Wage Policy, 91 U. PA. L.
R. 340 (1942). Third, the growth in the number and influence of labor unions led to increased
pressure for employee benefit plans. These demands received the sanction of the federal labor
laws with the holding in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949), that such plans are a mandatory issue of collective bargaining.
10. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1958).
11. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93rd. Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-3 (1973).
12. See note 78-83 infra and accompanying text.
13. An "issuer" is defined to mean "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
security.
... Securities Act, supra note 2, at § 2(4). The person most likely to be deemed the
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the opportunity to participate in the plan prior to filing a registration
statement with the SEC.14 The absence of a properly filed registration
15
statement would subject the issuer to the criminal penalties of the statute,
and would allow any employee contributing to the plan to bring a civil
action to recoup his contribution.1 6 Once filed, the issuer would be subject
to investigation and review by the Commission and to a stop order proceeding which, once lost, would forbid any further offering or sale of the interest
involved. 17 Assuming the registration statement was favorably reviewed
(the issuer would still be civilly liable for any misrepresentations contained
in it at the time it became effective), the issuer could then "sell' ' 18 and/or
deliver the interests. However, prior to or contemporaneously with delivery,
the issuer would be required to furnish employee-participants with a
current prospectus, disclosing vital information about the plan. The issuer
would again be criminally and civilly liable for misstatements or misrepresentations. 19
Note that absent the H.R. 10 situation or a clear case of overreaching, no
registration would be required at the investment medium level because
private offering exemptions would be available. The issuer of a plan not
exempt from the Securities Act of 1934 would generally be required to
register the plan with the Commission, as soon as its assets rose to
$1,000,000 and it covered 500 or more employees, whether or not it chose
to make a new offering. A condition precedent to the invocation of this
registration would be a finding that the plan in some manner satisfied the
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement. This would hardly be a
difficult task. Once required to register, the administrator would have to file
an application providing the Commission with detailed information on the
organization, financial structure, and nature of the plan; 20 and whatever
other information the Commission might deem "necessary or appropriate
• . . for the proper protection of investors... ."21 According to the
"issuer" in an employee benefit plan is the administrator of the plan. In his absence, or prior to
his designation, issuer status and liabilities would probably be accorded the employer establishing the plan.
14. Actually the use of "means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails" in connection with any such offering or sale is forbidden.
Id.§ 5. This jurisdictional requirement must be satisfied if the Securities Act is to be activated.
15. Id.§ 24.
16. Id. § II.
17. Id. § 5.
18. "Sell" is minimally defined as "disposition of a security ...
for value." Id. § 2(3).
This is where the Commission's "no sale" theory wrecks havoc on the application of the
Securities Act.
19. Section I I relief is triggered by a misstatement or material omission in the registration
statement at the time it "became effective." Claims for post-effective misdeeds must be made
under Section 12.
20. Securities Exchange Act, § 12b, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-h (1970) (original version at ch. 404, § 1
et. seq., 48 Stat. 881 (1934)) [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange Act].
21. Id. § 12(e).
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statute, such registration statement will become effective sixty days after
filing or "within such shorter period as the Commission may direct. '22
Once registered, the plan will be required to file annual or even quarterly
reports with the Commission. 23 Moreover, the Commission can require the
filing of any information it deems necessary to keep the file "reasonably
current." 24 As with all other provisions, failure to comply with this
provi25
sion would expose the issuer to both civil and criminal liability.
Absent the exemption from the Investment Company Act, any private
employee pension plan would fall within one of the statutory definitions of
"investment company" and thus be required to register. 26 Registration
under the statute is accomplished by filing a "notification of registration"
with the Commission.27 Upon receipt by the Commission of such notification, the plan would be deemed registered. As such, it would be exempt
from the registration requirement of the Exchange Act.28 However, the plan
would still be required to file a registration statement setting forth much the
same information, plus describing the plan's policy with respect to diversification, borrowing and lending of money, and special investments such as
real estate or commodities. 29 The employee benefit plan, once registered as
an investment company, would probably be considered a "unit investment
trust." 30 As such, it need not have a board of directors and is excluded from
many of the more stringent capital structure provisions. However, as a
registered investment company, it may not deviate from the investment
policies set forth in its registration statement, unless such change is authorized by a majority of its outstanding voting securities-or the equivalent, which in this case would be the participant. 3 Moreover, the contract
between the investment adviser and the plan would also have to (1) be
approved by the participants, (2) precisely describe the compensation arrangement, (3) expire at the end of two years, (4) provide for its termination
upon 60 days notice, and (5) provide, for its automatic termination in the
event of its assignment. 3 2
Perhaps most importantly, as a registered investment company, the Plan's
transactions with "affiliated persons" are closely scrutinized and in many
cases outright prohibited.3 3 Unless the Commission agrees that a proposed
22. Id.
23. Id. § 13(a).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 32.
26. Investment Company Act, § 8a, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1970) (original version at ch. 686,
tit. 1, § 1, 54 Stat. 789 (1940)) [hereinafter cited as Investment Company Act].
27. Id. § 8(b).
28. Securities Exchange Act, supra note 20, at § 12(g)(2)(B).
29. See note 85 infra.
30. Investment Company Act, supra note 26, at § 4(2).
31. Id. § 13.
32. Id. § 15.
33. Id. § 17(a).
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transaction is fair and consistent with the plan's policy, as set forth in the
regulation statement, no exemption order will be forthcoming. 34 Employers
would thus be almost automatically precluded from all but the most routine
dealings with the plans they establish.
Much of the same analysis would apply to the chosen investment medium
unless the medium served less than one hundred but more than ten plans.
B.

Exemption from Regulation

Today, none of the scenario need to occur. A series of key exemptions
effectively preclude application of any of the three acts to private employee
pension funds.
1.

The Investment Company Act

Although the most recent, the Investment Company Act, contained the
first direct mention of private employee pension plans, it adopted and has
maintained from its inception a two-tiered exemption. First, the statute
automatically exempts all plans "qualified" under the Internal Revenue
Code.3 5 Second, it empowers the SEC to exempt any and all others "if and
to the extent that such exemption is consistent with the protection of
investors. " 36 One searches in vain for legislative history explaining the
rationale and purposes of the exemption. There is none. As with many of the
key provisions in that particular statute, the curious course which led to the
statute's enactment necessitates looking elsewhere. 3 One source holds that
two explanations suggest themselves: "One, it may have been felt that
adequate protection was already provided by the Internal Revenue Code and
thus Investment Company Act coverage could be superfluous; two, there
may have been a general unwillingness to place the burdens of the Act upon
34. Id.§ 17(b).
35.

Id. § 3(c)(I1).

36. Id.§ 6(b).
37. Pursuant to § 30 of the Holding Company Act of 1935, the Commission made an
investigation of investment trusts and investment companies which covered a period of four
years and generated eleven reports to Congress. Legislation was introduced and extensive
hearings were held during which the Commission and the industry were heard. Hearings on S.
3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940Hearings].Although it was apparently clear to the industry that
some form of regulations was inevitable and might well serve to restore public confidence in the
operation of investment trusts, representatives of the companies affected nonetheless voiced
strong objection to the bill in its original form. Almost immediately after the conclusion of the
hearings, these representatives commenced private negotitations with the Commission in an
attempt to reach agreement on the scope and terms of the bill. The work product of these
meetings was reintroduced as S. 4108 and HR 10065, the latter bill passing unanimously and
with little debate. Speaking in support of the Senate version, its sponsor, Mr. Wagner, stated:
-[N]ot only do the witnesses who appeared before us in opposition to the original bill now
support this compromise measure but also it has the unanimous support . . . of the entire
industry. It is almost a miracle. I have never known it to happen in my experience as a legislator
that the industry affected has sought such regulation." 86 CONG. REC. 8843 (1940).
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employees who are not in the investment company business. 38 Another
source contends that "the most likely reasons" for the exemption were
probably: one, the relative unspeculative nature of the plans' assets in 1940,
and two, a desire to keep the cost to participants at a minimum.3 9 The
continued efficacy of these reasons will be discussed later. Suffice it to say
for the present that the Investment Company Act in unambiguous language
eliminates private employee pension plans from its coverage. Thus, even
were the SEC so inclined, it could not apply the provisions of this particular
statute to these plans.
2.

The Securities and Securities Exchange Act

A different picture presents itself when one focuses on the Securities and
Securities Exchange Acts. The exemptive provisions have only recently
been added. With virtually no discussion, the 91st Congress included in the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 197040 provisons, which in fact
and effect, exempted almost all existing and prospective employee pension
plans from the requirement of both statutes. The scarcity of legislative
history or commentary suggests that an analysis of the pre-1970 stance of
the Commission may be instructive.
With respect to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC's pre-1964
attitude is of little importance. The 1934 Act originally required registration
of, and therefore subjected to its reporting provisions, only those issuers
whose securities were traded on the national securities exchanges. 4 1 Thus, it
was not likely that any employee benefit plans could have been affected.
However, the 1963 amendments brought the then revolutionary 12(g). 4 2
from benefit
38. "Since the employer is prevented (by the Internal Revenue Code) ...
from the administration and operation of the pension trust . . . imposing the protections of the
Investment Company Act may not provide sufficient additional benefits to justify the cost of
requiring compliance with the act. The reluctance to impose the cost of compliance . . . on a
person who is not in the securities business, but who has decided to create a pension or other
benefit plan for his employee is reflected . . . (in the exemptive provisions)." Mundheim &
Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-SharingPlans,
29 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 795, 815 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Mundheim & Henderson].
39. Note, Commingled Trust Funds and VariableAnnuities: Uniform FederalRegulation of
Investment Funds Operated by Banks and Insurance Companies, 82 HARV. L. REv. 435, 460
(1968).
40. Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 206A, 84 Stat. 1413, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1970).
41. Securities Exchange Act, supra note 20, at § 12(a).
42. The "revolution" was destined to occur since Congress acted to regulate transactions
in outstanding securities under the Securities Act of 1934 by regulating national exchanges and
the securities registered on such exchanges. Section 15 of that Act provided the Commission
with authority to prescribe rules regulating the trading of securities over-the-counter in interstate commerce and to provide protection comparable to that provided in the case of national
exchange. This "double standard of investor protection" resulted not from any conviction that
adequate disclosure and other safeguards were not essential with respect to securities traded in
the OTC market, but start rather from a lack of understanding of and information regarding the
workings of that market. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1149-64 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as 2 Loss]. After thirty years of periodically updated studies and ill-fated legislative
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After the section became law, it was clear that a large number of plans had
the requisite $1,000,000 in assets, and 500 participants, to bring the plans
within the ambit of both registration and reporting provisions. The SEC
responded immediately and decisively. By rule, the agency expressly exempted from 12(g) "any interest or participation in (any employee benefit
plan) which is not transferable by the holder except in the event of death or
mental incompetency . . . . ,,"With one ruling, it erased the possibility that
the 1934 Act would ever have any bearing on employee benefit plans.
Dealing with the Securities Act was not quite as simple, however. The
discretionary exemptive powers of the SEC are more circumscribed." Thus,
it was necessary to fashion a far more creative scheme of avoidance. First,
the SEC invoked a variant of the "no-sale" theory whenever a plan called
for either compulsory contribution or no contribution from the employeeparticipants. 45 If there was no sale and no offer, there was no need to file a
registration statement and thus no violation of § 5. Next, the agency adopted
a "no-action" posture where the plan did not allow the actual investment in
the securities of the employer to exceed the contributions of the employer. 4 6
And thirdly, a Regulation A exemption was afforded to even voluntary plans
so long as the amount contributed within any given year did not exceed the
statutory limit of $300,000. 47
proposals, the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), finally stimulated the enactment
of § 12(g). Briefly, the effect of 12(g) is to bring within the registration requirements of § 12
OTC issues which are engaged in or affect interstate commerce and have both $1 million in
assets and a class of equity securities held of record by 750 (subsequently 500) persons. This, in
turn, subjects such issues to the periodic reporting, proxy solicitation and insider trading
requirements of § 13, § 14, and § 16. See generally Phillips and Shipman, An Analysis of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706; Sargent, The Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964: Background, Effect andPracticalities,20 SOUTHWESTERN L.J. 434 (1966);
Comment, An Appraisalof Some CoverageAspects of the 1964 SecuritiesAct Amendment, 60
Nw. U. L. R. 331 (1965).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-2 (1976).
44. Securities Act, supra note 2, at § 3(b)(c) contains the only two discretionary exemptions.
45. "As to the question of finding a 'sale' within the meaning of Section 2 (3) of the Act,
wherever a plan involves an investment contract or a certificate of interest or participation in a
profit-sharing agreement and the employees have a choice whether or not to make contributions, there is obviously an 'attempt or offer to dispose of * * * a security * * * for value.' On
the other hand, it is because of the language of Section 2(3) that we have taken the position in
the past that no 'offer' or 'sale' is involved in the case of a non-contributing plan, where the
employees are not requested to make any contributions, or in the case of a compulsory plan,
where there is no element of violation on the part of the employees whether or not to participate
and make contributions." Op. Ass't Gen. Counsel of Comm. [1941] 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2105.53, as amended, [1953] 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2105.51.
46. Id. Knowledgeable sources contend, however, that this has not always been the
position of the commission, and that "prior to 1951 companies were advised that plans under
which any contributions were invested in employer stock had to be registered." Mundhein and
Henderson, supra note 39, at 809 n.45.
47. Letter to CCH from Ass't Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., [1953] 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2105.51.
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Even with so liberal a policy, a substantial amount of plans would still not
seem to come within this exemptive scheme. Even if many of these plans
were excused from registration by one of the other automatic exemptions,
there would still be some left over to register. Few have. It also appears that
the general disinclination to proceed with registration reflects an accurate
perception of the SEC's unarticulated policy.
The exception to this disinclination is the H.R.10 plan.4 8 Immediately
after the enactment of the self-employed Individual Tax Retirement Act in
1962, the Chase Manhattan Bank announced that it would establish two
collective trust funds for these plans. The SEC immediately responded and
indicated that it considered such announcement a public offering of a
security and therefore, violative of Section 5 because no registration statement had been filed. 49 The ensuing debate with the Comptroller of the
Currency has been well documented.5 0 The jurisdictional dispute over the
regulation of common trust funds remains to this day. 5 ' Nevertheless, the
H.R. 10 plan, at least on the level of the investment medium, remains the
notable exception to the SEC's laissez-faire attitude toward private employee pension plans.
SEC RATIONALE FOR INACTION
The SEC never articulated a definitive rationale for its relaxed posture on
private pension funds. Several reasons may be advanced for the SEC's
reticence, however. The agency may have been reacting to the contention
that employee-benefit plans were not within the scope of the Securities Act;
it may have felt that the plans were both sufficiently numerous and different,
as to make enforcement administratively impossible; it may have thought
that forced compliance with the Act would be sufficiently burdensome as to
III.

48. Pub. L. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Self-Employed Individuals
Retirement Act].
49. Authors Mundheim and Henderson report that the initial response came that very day
during a dicussion of pension and profit-sharing plans for the self-employed then being sponsored by the Practicing Law Institute in New York. Mundhein & Henderson, supra note 38, at
795.
50. Id. at 824 et. seq.
51. The SEC has taken the position that the investor on a bank-managed commingled fund,
was in much the same position as the investor in a mutual fund, and thus the bank commingled
agency accounts were in fact the functional equivalent of a mutual fund. Letter from William
Cary, Chairman of the SEC to Senator Robertson, November 27, 1963 reported in Hearingson
S. 2704 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency of the U.S. Senate, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing]. The Comptroller of the Currency
asserted that Congress had not intended to include the activities of banks within the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and in fact specifically excluded the commingled funds with the § 3(c) (3)
language exemplify from the definition of "investment company"
. . . any common trust
fund or similar fund maintained by the bank . . . in its capacity as a trustee, executor,
administrator, or guardian . . .' " Letter from Comptroller of the Currency, James Saxon to
Senator Robertson (January 20, 1964), reprinted in Senate Hearings, at 634. The matter appeared to reach a plateau with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Investment Company Institute
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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discourage the growth of the plans; it may have felt that while securities
were involved in these plans, this was not primarily a securities matter but
pertained more closely to the fields of labor relations and taxation.
Absent other considerations and even without a clear indication from the
SEC, these factors suggest a cogent rationale for its low profile approach.
However, close scrutiny casts doubt on the efficacy of any of the reasons
propounded.
A.

Applicability of the Securities Act

It is true that there were those who questioned the Commission's contention that an interest in a plan of this nature was a "security" within the
meaning of the Securities Act. Congress had defined "security" in Section
2(1) of the Act to mean:
. . . any note, stock, treasury stock, bond debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "Security"..."
At no time did the Act make any specific reference to employee benefit
plans. It is the absence of such reference which constitutes a basis for the
contention that Congress had not intended to include such plans within the
scope of the Act.
In 1941, when the SEC sought to have Congress amend the Securities Act
to exclude certain well-defined plans from the registration provisions of the
statute, it was opposed by industry.5 3 Realizing that such exemption would
52. This definition was intentionally broad so as to assure that "the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security" would be
subjected to the provisions of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
53. The proposed exemption reads as follows:
(1) Any interest or participation in a savings, pension, profit-sharing or other employees'
benefit plan, if (A) the assests are required to be held in trust under the terms of which no
part of the corpus or income may be used for, or diverted to, purposes other than the
exclusive benefit of participating employees; (B) the employer is obligated to make cash
contributions at least annually, or, in the case of those plans in which the contributions of
the employer are determined by earnings before or after deduction of dividends, at least
annually in those years in which there are the specified earnings; (C) at least seventy-five
per centum of the assets is required to be held in cash or invested bonds, notes, or
debentures, or in securities exempted under paragraph (2) or (8) of this subsection, and no
part of the assets is permitted to be invested in securities of the employer or any associate
of the employer; (D) no portion of the interest of any employee in the plan other than that
in excess of the amount of his contributions is subject to forfeiture at any time by any
reason of termination of employment or otherwise; (E) it is required that annually there be
sent a report covering the preceding fiscal year of the trust and containing in substance,
(i) a statement of assets and liabilities, (ii) a statement of income and expenses, (iii) a
statement of cash receipts and disbursements, and (iv) a schedule showing the computation of amounts contributed by the employer to the trust, and there be made available upon
request to any employee or organization of employees a schedule covering the preceding
fiscal year of the trust and showing in substance the description, number of shares, or
principal amount, cost, carrying value, and, where determinable, market value of each
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create the negative implication that these interests are securities and are
subject to the fraud and other provisions of the Act, industry contended that
since Congress had intended to include employee benefit plans in the first
place, no such exemption was required.
In support of that contention, the industries purported to show that no
"State blue-sky law commission (had) even taken the position that these
plans . . . involve the issuance of or sale of securities. [further, that]
hundreds of these employee benefit plans . . . in existence in 1933, and
many more have been adopted . . . developed and used by the country's
largest and presumably best advised corporations," 54 and "no single instance had been brought to light of a voluntary registration. . . ."55 Finally,
the industries argue that the SEC itself evidenced an initially more narrow
construction of the Act; no claim of jurisdiction was asserted for many years
after the law became effective, and even now no substantial
number of these
56
plans have been subjected to a demand for registration.
The agency countered with the contention that Congressional intent to
permit the desired reading of "investment contract" could be inferred from
the explicit attention paid to "employee securities companies" by the
Investment Company Act of 1940. 5 ' The agency argued that the existence of
this exemption evidenced an intention to consider such interest a "security"
58
in the absence of language to the contrary.
In this regard, it has been noted:
It is a tenet of statutory construction that similar to words and
phrases which should not be isolated and given an abstract meaning,
the statute itself should be interpreted in reference to other relevant
laws, particularly those in pari materi. But this aid in construction
has its greatest usefulness in referencing an ambiguous enactment to
pre-existing or contemporaneous legislation. The Commission's arinvestment owned at the end of the fiscal year, the number of shares, and principal amount
of each investment acquired or disposed of, and the income or dividends received from
each investment held at any time during the year; and (F) it is required that before any
interest or participation is offered to any employee (or, in the case of any plan which is in
operation at the date this paragraph takes effect, within sixty days after such a date) a
summary of the plan be sent or given to such employee, and a copy of the trust instrument
creating the plan and a copy of the rules and regulations under the plan be made available
upon request to any employee or organization of employees, and such a summary and
such copies be filed with the Commission. 1941 Hearings, supra on note 1, at 908.
Mudnheim and Henderson observe "no industry witness appeared to testify on behalf of the
proposed amendments; but several industry witnesses testified against them." Mudnheim &
Henderson, supra note 38, at 811.
54. 1941 Hearings, supra note 1, at 968.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 958-62, 967, 975, 994.
57. See notes 15 and 16 supra. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a): "As used in
this section, 'investment securities includes all securities except . . . (B) securities issued by
employees' securities companies. ..
"
58. 1941 Hearings, supra note 1, at 895.
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gument would be entitled to greater weight if the enactment particu59
larly naming pension plans had preceded the more general one.
The SEC also contended that there was even stronger legislative history to
support their version of Congressional intent. They pointed to the defeat of a
proposed amendment which would have exempted from registration "an
offering made solely to employees by an issuer, or by its affiliates, in
connection with a bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or
stock investment plan for the exclusive benefits of such employees."60 A
dubious Congress was never convinced, however, as subsequent events in
1941 buried the legislation in the avalanche of World War II.
While Congressional receptivity to the SEC position in 1941 was not
warm, the agency could not claim that this was a major setback. Barring
further Congressional action, it is unlikely that the judiciary would have
afforded relief to a potential defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court has
literally adopted the SEC's definition of "investment contract" 61 and has
continuously reaffirmed its determination to consider all claims for exemp62
tions and exclusions in light of the broad remedial purposes ofthe Act.
The burden on the opposition would have been enormous had the SEC
chosen to act.
B.

Administrative Difficulty
The SEC's work load has been a cause of concern for some time. 63 The
agency currently processes over 3,000 Securities Acts registration statements a year-a staggering amount when one considers what is at stake. 64 It
is only through the constant utilization of multiple, informal mechanisms,65
and a procedure which has been termed "an excellent example of the
vaunted flexibility of the administrative process ,"66 that the paper crunch at
the SEC has not brought work to a grinding halt. It is clearly no simple
59. Note, Pensions Plans As Securities, 96 U. PENN. L. REV. 549, 561 nn. 84, 85, & 86
(1948).
60. 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934). The amendment was eliminated by the Conference Committee on the ground that participants in employees' stock investment plans may be in as great need
of protection afforded by availability of information concerning the issues for which they work
as are most other members of the public. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 42 (1934).
61. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 239 (1945) and lower federal cases cited therein at n. 5.
62. SEC. v. Howey has been followed frequently and is "perhaps the most frequently cited
case on the meaning of 'security' as used in the Securities Act." JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGUATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 299 (3rd ed. 1972).
63. 1L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 273 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as I L. Loss].
64. 298 Statements involving over $6.3 billion in offerings were processed by the Commission in November of 1972 alone. 32 SEC STATISTICAL BULL. No. 1, 20 (1973).
65. The Commission has recently expanded its efforts to expedite the processing of
registration statements. A division Officer presently conducts a "cursory review of every
registration statement" and decides whether it will receive: (1) no further review due to serious
deficiencies, (2) summary treatment of (3) full statutory review. Smith, An Overview of the
Registration Statement Process, in LEVENSEN, GOING PUBLIC: FILING PROBLEMS 14, 15, 16
(1970).
66. 1 L. Loss, supra note 63, at 272.
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in an area with a
matter to suggest an activist role for this particular agency
67
potential of tens of thousands of additional filings.
Employee benefit plans are not only numerous, they are also versatile.
There are endless ways to set up a plan which depend on the desires,
temperament, idiosyncrasies, and resources of the parties involved. A plan
could be contributory or noncontributory, trusted or not trusted, funded or
pay-as-you-go. It could be a savings plan, a stock purchase plan, a stock
bonus plan, or a profit-sharing plan. It could include an option for lump-sum
payments or merely provide for annuities. It could provide for defined
benefits or a defined contribution.
All these factors considered in light of the present work load suggest that
were this the SEC's concern, it would not be unfounded. However, the
reality of the situation is that insofar as the Securities Act is concerned,
many of these factors need not be considered by the SEC. Unlike the "fair,
just, and equitable" standard of the California Corporations Code, 68 the
Securities Act is a disclosure statute calling for a less substantive analysis by
the SEC. Moreover, the inclination to indulge in intricate or unique plans is
curbed by the desire to conform to the patterned plans which qualify for
favorable tax treatment. This tax incentive has effectively narrowed the area
in which the bulk of the private pension plans operate to those trusted and
funded stock bonus, proft-sharing and pension plans.
C. Conflicting Social Policies
Private provision of welfare and retirement benefits remains a relatively
new phenomenon, which is viewed as socially desirable and worthy of
67. The Commission officially expressed its concern during the hearings preceding enactment of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. One of the two major versions of the act
proposed that the SEC assume responsibility for the administration of its provisions. The
Commission responded:
The Commission has serious doubts that it should be named as the agency charged with
the administration of any of the pending bills in the fields of welfare and pension plan
legislation. The Commission's reasons are:
(1) The magnitude of the task imposed by this legislation would tend to overshadow the
Commission's present work. The Commission is reluctant to assume a job of such
potential size that would tend to submerge the Commission's main mission.
(2) Many of the plans involved in this legislation are the fruits of collective bargaining.
Accordingly, these plans are inseparably intertwined with labor-management relations.
Abuses in this area then have their main effect upon an economic area in which the
Commission does not possess expertise. It is true that the Commission and its staff have
developed an expertness in financial analysis of corporate securities and full disclosure of
financial information. Inasmuch as welfare and pension plan beneficiaries generally have
no individual choice as to the securities to be purchased by a welfare or pension fund, the
type of meaningful information furnished to them as to the management, investments and
transactions of their funds may involve quite different criteria from those presently
employed by the Commission under the various federal Securities Acts. An agency which
has had closer contact with the needs and problems in the labor-management field would
be in a better position to determine the appropriate criteria.
Hearings on Welfare and PensionPlans Legislation Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
LaborandPublic Welfare, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 119 (1957) [hereinfater cited as 1957 Hearings].
68. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113, 25140 (West 1976).
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government support in the form of tax incentives. Even more important is
the perceived need for the elimination of significant governmental obstacles
which tend to retard the development of this endeavor. The issue was stated
most clearly in a recent Congressional report:
It is . . . important to recognize that as desirable as strengthening

requirements for pension and profit-sharing plans may be, these
plans are essentially voluntary insofar as employers are concerned,
with the result that stronger requirements tend to discourage the
widening of the use of private pension and profit-sharing plans.
Therefore, a careful balancing of these two conflicting considerations is needed in considering recommendations to strengthen provisions relating to private pension and profit-sharing plans.69
Such a view is clearly not unreasonable. It may be, however, that a
perfect balance need not be struck, and that the underlying concern is
premised on a misapprehension of the extent to which "fringe benefits"
have become institutionalized. 70 It is relatively certain that parties dealing
with unions on an individual or industry-wide basis are not likely to abolish
or seriously impair the growth of presently existing plans. Nor will subsequent attempts by unions to negotiate employee benefits be significantly
hampered by securities considerations. Moreover, in the non-union situation, there is no reason to expect a change in the significant role fringe
benefits play in obtaining and retaining good employees. In sum, the
deterrence or the discouragement to which the committee referred is more
imagined than real.
D.

Labor and Taxation Interests
Partly as a result of continued, unfavorable publicity regarding the administration of employee benefit plans and partly due to Presidential prodding, a
Senate subcommittee was formed to conduct a congressional inquiry in May
1954. 71 The investigation continued in 1955 with the final report being
submitted in April 1956.72 After subsequent hearings, Congress enacted the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in 1959. 73 Until quite recently
that legislation was the single most important governmental incursion in the
area of employee benefit plans. 7
69. Panel Discussion on Tax Reform Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd
Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion (1973)].
70. See note 112 infra.
71. S. Res. 225, as amend, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 100 CONG. REC. 4311 (1954).
72. S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
73. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C. § 301-09 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act].
74. As finally passed in 1958, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was a watered
down version of what the Eisenhower Administration desired. It was amended in 1962 to afford
certain minimal regulatory powers to the Department of Labor. See Scaife, Problems with
Compliance with the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 14 Bus. LAW 762 (1959); and
Comment, The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 59 (AutumnWinter 1959).
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The fact that the legislation emanated from the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, coupled with the normal fact pattern of these
plans, would lend credence to a contention that this is not primarily a
securities matter. Even though the contention itself is arguable, it is
nevertheless an unprincipled reason for administrative inaction.
Even prior to 1970, the Securities Act textually afforded the Commission
the opportunity to bypass the entire issue. Section 2(1) states that all
enumerated interests were securities "unless the context otherwise requires." 75 This was not a phrase with which the Commission was unaccustomed. 76 Therefore, had the SEC felt that this was an area of little, if any,
significance insofar as federal securities law was concerned, the "investment contract" debate could have been avoided. But more important, to say
that an area is not primarily a securities area cannot be considered dispositive. It can be just as strongly contended that condominiums and oil wells
are primarily real estate questions, that franchises are matters of commerce,
and that proxies and tender offers are primarily corporation law. Yet each of
these businesses have important securities interests which are recognized
and dealt with as such. It is difficult to see how the interests of the
participants in a pension plan, regardless of how obtained,
are any less
77
worthy of protecting than the investor in orange groves.
E.

Speculativeness or Private Pensions
The dramtic growth in the size and coverage of the private employee
pension plans was noted earlier. Not yet mentioned, however, is the equally
dramatic change in the investment policy of these funds. Here are some of
the statistics. In 1951 (the earliest date for which figures are available) over
80% of all the assets of these funds were invested in U.S. government
securities and corporate bonds. 78 Only 15% was invested in equity securities
and of that about 4% was in preferred stock. 79 At the end of 1961 the SEC
could report:
75. "The touchstone should always be substance rather than form-whether it operates to
include or to exclude." I L. Loss, supra note 63, at 462.
76. Id. at 461,467.
77. SEC v. Howey involved an "offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled
with a contract for cultivating, marketing and remitting the net proceeds to the investor." 328
U.S. at 294. The Court held that this was an offering of an investment contract, saying inter
alia:
[A]n investment contract for purpose of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in
the physical assets employed in the enterprise. 328 U.S. at 299.
78. Div. OF ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMM., RELEASE No.
1335, SURVEY OF CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, 1951-1954, 2 (1955) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS].

79. Id.
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corporate securities accounted for $27.6 billion of pension fund
investments, or 85 percent of all assets; at best value. Of the total,
$15.1 billion was in corporate bonds and $12.4 billion in common and
preferred stock. U.S. Government to [only] $ 2.1 billion while cash,
mortgages and other investments

.

. .

make up the balance of $2.8

billion. Based on market values, investments in common and preferred stock comprised 51 percent of fund assets at the end of 1961 .8o
(emphasis added)
By the end of 1975, the private employee pension plans have
over 70% of
81
the assets-$1 11 billion dollars-in common stock alone.
This represents a clear and definite shift from "protected securities" to
common stock. The pension funds are the second largest investors in the
capital market. Only banks, via personal trust funds, and life insurance
companies, have greater assets82 (the life insurance companies have less
than 10% of its assets in common stock).8 3 Only the investment companies
are more heavily invested in common stock-over 80%. This being the
case, it is difficult to conceive that one could justify any current policy on
the grounds that private employee pension plans are "relatively unspeculative. ,84
F.

Costs of Compliance
A final rationale for the Commission's recalcitrance need only be stated
here, because it will be dealt with extensively in the latter portion of this
note.
To a great extent, these participants did not appear to be true
investors and . . . the employer who created the pension plan was
not in the pension plan business and . . . it [is] therefore inappro-

priate to saddle him with the costs of complying with the provision
of the federal securities law.8
Though far more formidable than any of those will show, this reasoning
begs the question and presupposes both indivisibility between registration
(with its inherent costs) and disclosure, and the impossibility of reducing the
costs. Subsequent discussion will explore both premises and take issue with
them.
1970 AMENDMENTS
Prior to the 1970 legislative changes, the Commission's position was
clear, if not definite. Unless an H.R. 10 or employer stock purchase plan
IV.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE UNDER

SEC STATISTICAL BULL., Release 1828, 1 (May 22, 1962).
35 SEC STATISTICAL BULL., No. II (Nov. 1976).

Id.
Id.
Id.
S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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was involved, neither registration nor disclosure was required. To what
extent the 1970 amendments in fact codified administrative policy remains
to be seen. What is clear, however, is that post 1970 policy is equally
unsupported by any affirmative, articulated rationale. Less than two pages
of the committee's report was devoted to the two sections containing the
amendments, and almost all of that was interpretive in nature. 86 It may thus
be assumed that whatever rationale undergirded the pre-1970 legislation
must be attributed to the 1970 legislation as well. As the validity and
viability of the conceivable reasons are questionable at least, it is unlikely
that the subsequent action is in any way supportable.
However, rather than allowing the 1970 amendments to fall on the ground
that they reflect a policy which is demonstrably uncertain, it may be
instructive to evaluate the changes on their own merits.
The 1970 amendments created a special exemption from the Securities
Act and Securities Exchange Act for "any interest or participation in a
single or collective trust fund maintained by a bank or in a separate account
maintained by an insurance company which interest or participation is
issued in connection with [an employee benefit plan] which meets the
requirements for qualification under [the Internal Revenue Code].", 87 Excluded from this sweeping exemption were H.R. 10 plans and "[plans] the
contributions under which are held in a single trust fund maintained by a
bank, or in a separate account maintained by an insurance company for a
single employer, and under which an amount in excess of the employers
contribution is allocated to the purchase of securities . . . issued by the

employer or by any company [in a control relationship] with the employer. '88
To qualify under the relevant provisions of the tax code 89 prior to ERISA,
a plan had to be (1) a trusteed plan; (2) providing for contributions by either
employer or employee or both; (3) with the purpose of distributing both
corpus and income to the employees or their beneficiaries at some future
date in accordance with such plan; (4) with a trust instrument that makes it
impossible to divert either corpus or income; and (5) which is nondiscriminatory and non-forfeitable. The wording of the exemption adopts these
criteria and further requires-that the funds must be "maintained" by a
bank or insurance company.
Once the requirements are satisfied, the amended language of 3(2) exempts from the non-fraud provisions of the Act the security interest held by
the plan in the investment medium, as long as the investment medium Is the
separate account of an insurance company or a single or commingled bank
86.
87.
88.
89.

See note 40 supra.
Id.
Id.
Internal Revenue Code §§ 401-404.
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fund. To the extent that the 1970 legislation exempted interests in the single
and collective trust fund of banks from the Act, it did partially codify preexisting Commission policy. It did expand somewhat on that policy by
including the separate accounts of insurance companies within the purview
of the exemption. 90 But its refusal to include H.R. 10 plans, and plans in
which an amount in excess of the employer's contribution is directly invested in stock of the employer or of a company in a control relationship, is
perfectly in accord with pre-1970 practice.
Two caveats must be noted at this point. The first concerns the statutory
language "maintained." The second is a limitation of the term "collective."
The Commission takes the position that "maintained" means much more
than the mere carrying out of ministerial duties. In 1971, Bank of America
sought to establish a new method of handling both corporate and industrywide employee benefit plans. The essence of the proposal involved the
creation of three competing separate funds, each with a different investment
advisor and medium. Bank of America felt that this competitive situation
would maximize profits and improve all around investment performance.
Specifically referring to the "maintained by a bank" language in the
amended Act, the Division of Corporate Finance said:
We interpret the exclusion and the exemption to be unavailable
where the bank acts as a mere custodian for the collective trust fund
and does not exercise substantial investment responsibility. 9
An equally firm pronouncement was soon forthcoming on the commingling issue. In 1971, the Commercial National Bank in Shreveport decided
that operational reasons made it desirable to administer two common trust
funds on a commingled basis. One fund had been restricted to funds held by
the bank as trustee of corporate refinement, pension and proft-sharing plans.
The other consisted of restricted funds held by the bank as trustee for
qualified H.R. 10 plans. The SEC refused to issue a no-action letter, stating:
This Division has consistently taken the position that where a security is offered or sold to two different classes of persons only one
offering is involved and it thus follows that if the trusts are commingled, neither exemption will be available for the trust and registration under the Act would be required. 92
90. See note 87 supra, and accompanying text.
91. Bank of America [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78, 614 at 81,
308.
92. Commercial National Bank 11971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,
384, at 80, 865. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(1) exempts from the definition of company
"any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short term paper) are beneficially owned
by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose
to make a public offering of its securities." The section goes on to say that "beneficial
ownership by a company shall be deemed to be beneficial ownership by one person, except
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It may be argued that since a literal reading of the text shows no mention
of the employees interest, no exemption was intended on this level. Such an
argument is, of course, too narrow and contrary to the scant legislative
history of the amendments. It is more accurate to say that the employee
interest is exempt in retrospect-that is, from the moment the plan is
"maintained" by the bank or insurance company.
Thus, the only real change may be that in effect, if not in fact, the plan be
qualified and the designated trustee be banks or insurance companies.
S.E.C. INACTION
The net effect of the present treatment is a blanket exemption from the
registration, disclosure and civil liability provisions of federal securities
legislation. Arguably the shotgun approach is unnecessary or inconsequential due to a similar protection afforded by other statutes. A cost benefit
analysis might suggest that the protective scheme is not worth it. However,
with these considerations in mind, the inquiry should focus on whether a
more finely tuned exception, if any at all, would be more appropriate.
V.

EFFECT OF

A.

Registration
Registration, as we now know it, is seen as a means of assuring disclosure
and has little value in itself. Yet accountant fees, legal fees, and filing fees
make this process extremely costly. Unlike the producers of goods or
services, the employee benefit plan has no consumers among whom it can
spread the cost. Nor are there tax provisions to reduce the impact. Costs
incurred will be borne out of pocket by someone. That someone will more
than likely be the plan itself, and in reality, its beneficiaries. This consideration suggests that the relief from the registration process afforded by
this exemption is both justifiable and desirable.
B.

Reporting
To a large extent, many of these same considerations apply to those
provisions requiring periodic reporting. Annual, semi-annual or quarterly
reports can be quite costly. However, as distinguished from registration (at
least registration in the Securities Act sense), the reporting provisions bring
into play the ongoing oversight function of the involved governmental
agency. Regarded by Congress as "the minimum which is requisite for the
that, if such company owns 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the issue,
the beneficial ownership shall be deemed to be that of the holder of such company's outstanding securities."
Thus, while less than one hundred plans may take the investment medium out of the
definition of investment company, less than ten could bring it back in again if the greater than
10% interest of the at least one participating plan would trigger the latter provision. Query,
however, whether what is involved is a voting security.
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adequate protection of investors," 93 the reporting provisions should not
have been so hastily abandoned, and deserve reappraisal as much as any
provisions., The current prospectus and reporting provisions only theoretically assure "disclosure" for the employee-participant in a non-exempt
plan. (For purpose of the following discussion, the SEC's "private offering" analysis of relationship between the plan and its investment medium
will be accepted and attention will be focused on the primary level of
interest-that of the employee-participant). Form S-894 would require that
each prospective participant be given the following information in writing
prior to joining the plan: (1) who may participate; (2) contribution arrangement; (3) withdrawal procedure; (4) default effect; (5) administrative set up;
(6) detailed investment policy and activity; (7) lien provisions; (8) termination and extension conditions; (9) other charges and deductions; (10) financial statement of the plan. Form S-8 and these requirements would apply to
very few current plans.
C. Disclosure
It certainly has not been the case that the refusal of the federal securities
laws to impose its prospectus provisions on employee benefit plans was
compensated by any significant disclosure requirements in other legislation.
Neither the language nor administrative policy of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act, 95 and the Internal Revenue Code, 96 even approximate
the disclosure standards of the Securities Act. Not surprisingly, no mention
of disclosure is made in the Internal Revenue Code. A descriptive note
conspicuously displayed in the principal place of employment suffices
insofar as administratively required disclosure is concerned. 97
The Welfare and Pension Plans Act disclosure requirements were more
elaborate, but hardly any more effective. Under the provisions of that
statute, the administrator of the plan was required to publish a description of
the plan, and the annual reports were to be filed With the Secretary of
Labor. 98 To "publish" these documents, the administrator had only to (1)
make them "available for examination by any participant or beneficiary in
the principal office of the plan;" and (2) "deliver upon written request to
such participant or beneficiary a copy of the description of the plan. . . and
an adequate summary of the latest annual report, by mailing such documents
to the last known address of the participant or beneficiary making such
request." 99 Whatever the content, it is clear that the mode of disclosure and
the absence of civil liability for improper or no disclosure, created, in both
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

2 L. Loss, supra note 42, at 811.
Form S-8 was adopted on May 7, 1953.
See discussion in Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 38, at 815-819.
Id. at 906.
Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961-2 C.B. 67, 74.
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, supra note 73, at § 304.

99. Id.
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instances, disclosure of a much different kind than that normally required by
the Securities Act. 00
Civil Liabilities and Remedies
The third and related consequence is the complete reprieve from the civil
liability provisions which the exemption occasions. As these plans are not
subject to the registration provisions at section 5, the section 11 remedy for
untrue statements in or material omissions from the registration statement is
of no avail. As an exempted security (as opposed to an exempted transaction), however, the exemptive protection is not limited to sections 5 and 11.
D.

100. The question underlying this discussion, however, is "why disclosure?" Admittedly
much of how one answers that question depends upon a predisposition in an area unsusceptible
to tangible proof. As has no doubt been perceived, the author would err in favor of disclosure.
While disclosure has not been sanctioned by its four decade reign as conceptual monarch of
securities law, the rationale supporting it is still persuasive in general, and specifically applicable to employee benefit plans.
First and foremost, disclosure should provide the investor with information needed to make a
sensible decision. Such information should be in a form clearly understandable to the ordinary
investor. In the Matter of Universal Camera Corp., 19 SEC 648 (1945). See generally 1 L. Loss,
supra note 63, at 261 et seq. Experience bears testimony to the fact that there are occasions
when due to the complexity of the security or the relative lack of sophistication of the investor,
disclosure in no way rationalizes an unassisted investor function. It is in instances such as these
that a secondary function, that of providing the professionals with the relevant information,
becomes important. "The act thus operates to put the security dealer (and the investment
advisor), who should possess the financial and economic erudition to analyze and evaluate the
" Heller, Disclosure Require(information) . . . between the investor and the (issuer) ....
ments, under Federal Securities Regulations, 16 Bus. LAW 301 n.6 (1961). A third and important
aspect of disclosure is its "chilling effect" upon borderline conduct. This point has not been
stated better than Mr. Justice Brandeis' 1914 rendition:
Publicity is justly recommended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants: electric light the most efficient policeman. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1917).
A fourth and often overlooked feature of disclosure is its catalytic potential. Much of the
information being used to spearhead the current agitation in the area of corporate responsibility
and corporate reform was discovered in prospectuses and registration and proxy statement.
An oft expressed notion in the area of employee benefit plans is that the area of violition is so
small as to make meaningful choice impossible. After all, to work or not to work is no choice at
all. True, but hardly responsive. A prospective participant in an employee benefit plan may
have a choice between jobs. The prospective participant may have to choose what, if any,
investments to make with his take-home pay; what kind of any insurance he should purchase;
and when and under what conditions to retire. Moreover, the minimal volition argument ignores
the third and fourth functions of disclosure. It is certainly possible to assert that at least a
portion of the alleged mismanagement of existing plans would not occur were they required to
make available a great deal more information. And it is equally certain that disclosure would
readily lend itself to more actual participation in the plan by the inactive investor thus far called
"participants".
For the author at least, the most cogent reason for applying the more stringent disclosure and
civil liability provisions sounds in afortiori. If an employee who as a hobby invests $1000 of his
take-home pay in various and sundry securities can count on being afforded the protection of
the federal securities laws, certainly that same employee who contributes in one way or another
to a plan on which he depends to provide for his family in case of illness, disability, retirement
or death, deserves at the very least the same protection. The real impact of the exemptive
treatment is that it refuses to extend even the minimal disclosure protection to the employee
who must blindly trust his family's entire future to the goodwill of a few big-time investors.
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It extends to section 12(2).101 The exemptive language, strategically placed
in subsection 2 of section 3, completes the coverage. Section 3(2) is the only
subsection also exempted from 12(2).
The effect of these sections is that an employee could have become a
participant in a plan due to false and misleading statements of the plan
administrators and have no remedy whatsoever under the statute unless he
can prove actual fraud. 0Otherwise,
he is left to the uncertain mercy of his
2
common law remedies.'
As with the disclosure provisions, no other statutory provisions are
available to fill the breach. Theoretically, the Internal Revenue Service
could disqualify the plan-a move of dubious implications and of no benefit
for the employee participant. 103 The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act imposes a different type of liability for failure or refusal to disclose, and
none for false and misleading statements. 104
Crucial to this discussion are the substantive restrictions imposed by the
Investment Company Act. Viewed in light of the fact that the employee
benefit plans are no longer "unspeculative", one searches for an explanation to exclude these plans from the scope of the Act's protection. The
question to be asked again is whether there is comparable legislation that
imposes similar restrictions on investment policy transactions potentially
inimical to the plan's beneficiaries. Again the answer seems negative. No
help is forthcoming from either current state law, common law fiduciary
standards, or existing federal legislation.
Until ERISA, neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act purported to deal directly with investment
policy. In the latter, the issue of investment came up solely in connection
with the disclosure requirements. In the Internal Revenue Code, investment
policies were only indirectly affected by the "exclusive benefit" rule and by
prohibition of certain types of transactions. Section 401 requires that trust
funds be used for the exclusive benefit of the employees and their beneficiaries. This requirement is satisfied if:
101. Section 2(1) merely provides a civil remedy for a violation of section 5. Securities Act,
supra note 2, at § 12(l).
102. There may be times, especially in cases of deceit, where the relatively short statute of
limitations may make a common law action preferable. Those times are few and far between.
103. See note 106 infra.
104. Section 308 of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Provides:
(a) Penalty for violations
Any person who willfully violates any provisions of this Act shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
(b) Liability for failure or refusal to make publication.
Any administrator of a plan who fails or refuses, upon the written request of a participant or beneficiary covered by such plan, to make publication to him within thirty days of
such request, in accordance with the provisions of section 307 of this title, of a description
of the plan or an annual report containing the information required by sections 305 and 306
of this title, may in the court's discretion become liable to any such participant or
beneficiary making such request in the amount of $50 a day from the date of such failure or
refusal.
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I.

the cost of the investment (does) not exceed its fair market value
at the time of purchase, and
2. the investment (will) provide a fair return commensurate with
the prevailing rate, and
3. sufficient equity (is) maintained to permit distribution in accordance with the terms of the plan, and
4. the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would
adhere to are present."°5
Reasonable as these guidelines may initially appear, they present an unenforceable standard. Enforcement depends upon the sporadic audits conducted by the IRS. Even where questionable transactions are detected, the IRS
has been reluctant to act in all but the most extreme cases. 0 6 Such reluctance is no doubt engendered by the realization of the inherent non-exclusivity in this area. Rarely will the trust receive a benefit without some commensurate (even if intangible) benefit accruing to the employer-that is, unless
such benefit is at the employer's expense.
A greater reason for IRS reluctance may be the exclusivity of the remedy.
The agency has at its disposal only its ultimate weapon of disqualification,
which is the same remedy available should the plan engage in any so-called
"prohibited transactions." Under Section 503 of the Internal Revenue
Code, a qualified trust can lose its exempt status if it engages in certain
"prohibited transactions" specified in Section 503(b). These involve any
transaction in which the Qualified Trust (i) lends any funds to the employer
withoutthe receipt of adequate security and a reasonable rate of interest; (ii)
pays any compensation to the employer in excess of reasonable compensation for services actually rendered to the Trust; (iii) makes any substantial
purchase of securities or other property from the employer for more than an
adequate consideration; (iv) sells any substantial part of its securities or
other property to the employer for less than an adequate consideration; or (v)
engages in any other transaction which results in a substantial diversion of
its funds to the employer. Section 503(b) prohibits any diversity of funds,
pursuant to the enumerated prohibited transactions, not only to the employer, but also to (i) any person who has made a substantial contribution to the
Trust (or any family member of such person), or to (ii) any corporation
105. Fries, Investing for Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Fries].
106. Rev. Rul. 73-352, 1973-2 C.B. 324.
The Service advised that the services performed by individuals who became employees
of a regional authority and received coverage under the State's retirement system when
the 'authority acquired a privately owned transit company do not constitute "covered
transportation service" within the meaning of section 3131(j)(3) of the Code and are
excepted from employment under section 312(b)(f). Social Security coverage may be
obtained only by an agreement between the State and the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare.
STUDY:
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controlled (through 50% stock ownership) by the employer. 01 7 But as was
pointed out by the Senate Finance Committee, "(the current) prohibited
transaction provision is not effective both because the present prohibited
transactions are limited in nature and because the penalty for noncompliance
is the disqualification of the pension plan. . . . This penalizes the covered
employees who have had no part in any wrongdoing."1 0 8 This is a far cry
from Investment Company Act protection.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF THE BLANKET EXEMPTION

In the light of the preceding analysis, it is not presumptuous to inquire
whether this blanket exemption is necessary. Is it necessitated by the overall
exemptive scheme of federal securities legislation? By its internal consistency? By the over-riding considerations of costs? By lack of a suitable
alternative? The answer is "no" on all counts.
A.

Exemptive Scheme

Were one to generalize about the exemptive scheme of the 1933 Act, one
could say that the exemptions fall into five categories: one, where there
could presumptively be no abuse, i.e., where the security is reissued or
guaranteed by an agency or instrumentality of a governmental unit; two,
where alternative government regulatory machinery is mandatorily and
directly involved, i.e. Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Reserve
Board, state insurance commissions; three, where there is clearly no investment intent, i.e., short-term notes, drafts, bills, non-profit organization;
four, where federalism prescribes federal intervention, i.e. intrastate ex107. "Section 503(b) does not, by its terms, extend to all parties affiliated with the employer,
such as a parent corporation of the employer or stockholders, officer of directors of the
employer. In Rev. Rul 58-526, the Service was satisfied with a literal interpretation and held
that the purchase by a Trust of debentures issued by the parent of the employer was not a
prohibited transaction. Similarly, the Service held in Rev. Rul. 72-532 that an unsecured loan by
a qualified trust to a corporation with the same controlling stockholder as the employer
corporation did not constitute a prohibited transaction under Section 503 (b) since the "brothersister" corporation was not one of the parties specified in Section 503 (b). Despite Rev. Ruls.
58-526 and 72-532. I recommend that the spirit of the prohibited transaction rules be followed in
all situations involving any transactions between the exempt trust and any person or entity
having any interest in the employer. Any violation of the spirit of the prohibited transaction
rules could be attacked by judicial interpretation of Section 503 (b) extending the statute beyond
its literal language, or alternatively, by contending that the transaction is not for the exclusive
benefit of the employes. The latter approach has in fact been taken in Rev. Rul. 73-282,
disqualifying a pension fund which made an unsecured loan of substantially all its funds to a
corporation whose stock was owned by the principal shareholder of the employer corporation.
The Service held that the loans were not for the exclusive benefit of the employees since they
did not provide the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would require. This
approach had previously been intimated in Rev. Rul. 71-462, holding that a loan from a multiemployer pension trust administered by a joint employer-union board to the union that
negotiated the plan was not a prohibited transaction since the union is not a party specified in
Section 503 (b), but warning that the loan must still be for the exclusive benefit of the
employees." Fries, supra note 105, at 182-83.
108. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1973).
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emption; five, where the investor should be able to fend for himself-i.e.
private offering exemption. Four of the five are of no real consequence to
the instant discussion. As no agency or instrumentality of any governmental
unit issues or guarantees the interest in private employee benefit plans, the
presumption portion of the generalization can be disposed of with dispatch.
Since wholly intrastate plans are exempted anyway, that issue resolves
itself. Finally, any assertion that the average investor-employee meets all
but the very minimal level of sophistication in the management, investing
policies and actuarial computation of a normal employee benefit plan,
would be so contrary to experience as to deserve no rebuttal. Whether there
is a lack of investment intent may raise a more fundamental question. It is
true that the employee-participants do not appear to be "playing the market", but neither is the investor in a mutual fund. Despite language indicating that employee participants do not appear to be "true investors," the
nature of the expectation clearly defies any but the most determined attempts
to distinguish between the interest involved and other protected interests, on
the basis of investment intent.
The fifth and final part of the exemptive scheme, which defers to the
intimate involvement of alternative governmental regulatory mechanisms,
seems apposite. The involvement of the Department of Labor and the IRS,
mandated by the Federal Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act and the
Internal Revenue Code respectively, lends credence to a contention that it is
with this portion of the generalized scheme that the employee benefit plan
exemption is compatible. Analysis of the present exemption under this
proposed rationale, however, casts doubt upon the validity of this contention. The common and indispensable feature of the specific exemption is the
supervisory role played by the governmental agency. Neither the role of the
Labor Department or of the Internal Revenue Service is supervisory in
nature. Any attempt to analogize them to the Federal Reserve Board, state
banking and insurance commissions, or the Interstate Commerce Commission is inapposite. The IRS is primarily concerned with assuring that the
income on which no tax is paid by the employer is truly divorced from his
use, and that the plan is not merely a gimmick to provide a tax shelter for
highly compensated officers and employers. The IRS has little to do with the
amount and quality of information provided participants, with, management
decisions or with investment provided participants, or with management
decisions or with investment policies in general. While some of its primary
concerns result in vesting requirements and reduced discrimination in coverage, which no doubt protects the interest of employee participants, serendipity should not be subsituted for supervision.
On the other hand, the legislative history of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act specifically states that its objective is disclosure, not
regulation or supervision.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977

25

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1977], Art. 4

224

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

It is designed to place the primary responsibility for the policing and
improved operations of these plans upon the participants themselves. The scope of the bill is limited to disclosure and reporting and
does not go into the field of regulation.109
It is obvious that Congress could have amended the statutes and invalidated any alleged pre-existing legislative scheme. The above discussion
neither assumes nor suggests otherwise. However, it does illustrate that the
elimination or modification of the exemption in question will work no
doctrinal or structural harm to the overall exemptive scheme. In the absence
of such harm, concern for the demonstrably heavy impact on the investment
interest of the employee-participant ought to be given greater weight.
B.

Internal Consistency
In addition to being poorly and ambiguously worded, the current blanket
exemption abounds with discrepancies. Both the Securities and Securities
Exchange Acts distinguished H.R. 10 plans from regular corporate plans;
they both distinguish between employer and employee contributions for the
purpose of limiting the amount capable of being invested in the employer's
securities. The Investment Company Act does neither. However, all three
acts distinguish the IRS "qualified" plans from those which are not-a
distinction that is not necessarily significant in terms of effect but of
questionable justification nonetheless.
The Commission's historical antipathy to the H.R. 10 plan has been welldocumented and, as indicated earlier, was codified in the 1970 amendments.
History aside, however, in view of the additional restriction imposed by the
IRS on the H.R. 10 plan, it appears anomalous that the H.R. 10 plan, rather
than the corporate plan, does not more readily deserve exemptive treatment.
That decision can certainly be argued by the Congress, which has otherwise
chosen to rely on IRS policing.
This anomaly raises the two-tiered analysis mentioned earlier. It has been
the Commission's consistent position that it is at the second level-the
investment medium-that it is interested. At this level, the normal owneremployee, lacking both sophistication and bargaining power, may be as
much in need of protection as the average investor. This might be true. But
it does not serve as a total explanation for the statutory prescription. No
distinction is made between the tiers, and one may conclude that even on the
participant level of a H.R. 10 plan, the exemption is inapplicable, and
compliance with at least the Securities Act is required. Such may not have
been the intent but in theory it is the effect.
It was once thought that some minimum protection could be offered
participants if the corporate employers were discouraged from investing all
109. Report of the Senate, House and Conference Comm., 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted
in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4137, 4154.
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or substantially all the assets of the plan in the employer's securities.
Though never articulated, it may have been perceived that the alternative
course was tantamount to vitiating any funding requirement, or that it was
anomalous to allowing an employee a deduction for funds which would
wind up in his capital accounts. Whatever the case, it was determined that if
an amount in excess of the employer's contribution was invested in the
employer's stock, the plan would be required to comply with the 1933 and
1934 acts. As with any crude rule of thumb, this determination was not
perfect to begin with, and in this particular instance, became meaningless.
Such a limitation was of questionable significance in 1951 when employee
contributions amounted to 1.2 billion dollars.'1 0 In 1974, employers contributed in excess of 16.9 billion dollars. "' Under the existing limitations, all of
this amount could be invested in the employer's securities with the exemption still applicable.
From its beginning, such a formulation was ill-advised, but it illustrates a
significant point. The SEC and Congress continue to distinguish between
employer and employee contributions; and they fail to conceptualize the
employee benefit plan as a part of the total compensation package arranged
to maximize convenience and/or minimize taxes." 2 The immediate source
of the contribution is not nearly as important as the fact that this is a
bargained for exchange.
Finally, by refusing to articulate distinct substantive bases for the exemptions, and by relying totally on the IRS, the Securities and Securities
Exchange Acts made possible the situation where a perfectly sound plan and
an investor point of view is excluded from the exemption, because, for one
reason or another, it does not comply with IRS requirements. That this is not
a widespread problem is undisputed. But neither is its existence. When
considered with the other internal inconsistency of the blanket exemption,
this situation is yet another reason for the exemption's demise.
CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, supra note 78.
111. See note 81 supra.
112. Remarks of Brandisi, Louis J. Jr., and Kielley, James E., "The Concept of Total
Composition" to the Electronics, Wage, & Salary Association (Dec. 8, 1966):
"The development of effective programs in the direct compensation area without equally
good programs in the indirect area, does not achieve the overall compensation objectives
of most companies ....
Within the framework of sound organizational planning and the problems of motivation
facing the individual company, the emphasis as to compensation must be on a total
compensation approach.
By 'total compensation' we mean the sum of all the direct and indirect compensation
elements utilized by a company in compensating its employees. This is our thesis, that all
of these elements should be effectively mixed and balanced to help satisfy (a) the
important needs of the individual and, at the same time, (b) the compensation objectives of
the corporation.
Although a mixed and blanced approach to total compensation is desirable, the authors
note a number of factors which inhibit the development and implementation of such
programs. Among those factors is:
3. Government control-the extent to which certain elements of total compensation
are allowed or appropriate.

110.
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The current security treatment of employee benefit plans offers the worst
of two worlds. It refuses to extend valuable investor protection to the
employee participant. At the same time, it leaves many questions openquestions which the SEC has and will be called upon to answer.
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